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RECENT CASES
ADMIRALTY-LONGSHOREMAN'S PERSONAL INJURIES-UN-
SEAWORTHINESS NOT ESTABLISHED BY OPERATIONAL NEGLIGENCE
OF FELLOW LONGSHOREMEN
Petitioner and fellow longshoremen were loading cargo onto
the S.S. Edgar F. Luckenbach from a barge positioned alongside a
New Orleans dock. Petitioner's job was to secure the cargo
to a sling lowered from a winch aboard ship. At one point, the
sling was not lowered far enough to attach the cargo, so peti-
tioner motioned to the flagman on deck to have the sling lowered
farther. The winch operator, also a longshoreman, lowered the
sling too far and too fast, causing it to fall upon and injure peti-
tioner. The winch was not mechanically defective in any way.
Petitioner brought an action for damages against respondent ship-
owner in federal district court alleging negligence and unseawor-
thiness of the vessel. Respondent's motion for summary judgment
was denied, but the court granted leave to take an interlocutory
appeal.' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ordered
the 'motion for summary judgment granted, holding that "'[i]n-
stant unseaworthiness' resulting from 'operational negligence'
of the stevedoring contractor is not a basis for recovery
by an injured longshoreman. '"2 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari,' and affirmed in a 5-4 decision. Held, where a long-
shoreman's injuries were caused by a single and wholly unfore-
seeable act of negligence by a fellow longshoreman, the shipowner
is not liable because of unseaworthiness of the vessel. Usner v.
Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, rehearing denied,
401 U.S. 1015 (1971).
4
The history by which the Supreme Court created no-fault
liability for one class of litigants (seamen) and then extended it
to another class of litigants (longshoremen) has been described
as "without parallel in American legal history."5 In fact, no area
1. See 28 US.C. § 1292 (b) (1964).
2. 413 F.2d 984, 985-86 (5th Cir. 1969).
3. 397 U.S. 933 (1970).
4. Hereinafter cited as instant case.
5. Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Right of Harbor Workers, 89 COR-
NELL L. Rxv. 381, 382 (1954).
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of federal law better illustrates "judicial legislation" than the
law of admiralty.0 Despite this, the development of the seaman's
right to recover for injuries caused by the ship's unseaworthiness
is "far from clear." 7
The concept of unseaworthiness is first mentioned in Ameri-
can judicial opinions involving seamen suing for wages. If the sea-
man could prove unseaworthiness of the vessel, his desertion was
excused and he could recover his wages. Additionally, the concept
was found in the early rules governing marine insurance and car-
riage of goods by sea." Traditionally, the seaman's compensation
for personal injuries was limited to "maintenance and cure,"
which amounted to medical treatment and wages for the dura-
tion of the voyage. But by the end of the nineteenth century,
American admiralty courts allowed the seaman to recover beyond
maintenance and cure if he could show that his injuries were
caused by the shipowner's negligence-a failure to exercise due
diligence in providing the seaman with a reasonably safe place to
work.9 Common law negligence principles determined liability;
ordinary care was the standard imposed both on the shipowner
and the employer of dockside workers.
In 1903, the landmark decision of The Osceola0 brought
the concept of unseaworthiness into seamen's personal injury liti-
gation. The seaman in this case sustained injuries as a result of
an improvident order negligently given by the ship's master. The
following dictum, one of four propositions "considered as set-
tled" by the Court, was the first clear statement of the shipowner's
responsibility to the seaman to furnish a "seaworthy" ship:
ihe vessel and her owners are . .. liable to an indemnity
for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unsea.
worthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in
good order the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship. 1
6. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960) (dissent).
7. Id. at 543.
8. Id. at 544.
9. Id.
10. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
11. Id. at 175. The other three settled propositions were: (1) that the shipowner
is liable for maintenance and cure during the voyage should the seaman fall sick or be
wounded; (2) that seamen cannot recover for injuries sustained as a result of other
crew members' negligence (the fellow-servant rule); and (3) that seamen may not re-
cover an indemnity for negligence of master or crew, and are entitled only to main-
tenance and cure, whether negligence or accident caused the injuries.
218
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The duty imposed on the shipowner was governed by common
law negligence standards of ordinary care.
In 1920, Congress passed the Jones Act'2 which gave sea-
men a remedy for injuries caused by the negligence of fellow crew-
members. The practical effect of this legislation was to abolish
the common law fellow-servant rule13 and allow recovery based
"on negligence either by the act of any of the 0fficers, agents or
employees of the shipowner or by reason of any defect or insuffi-
ciency of the vessel's appliances, appurtenances and equip-
ment."'1 4 The Jones Act immediately became and is still a pri-
mary ground of recovery for seamen's personal injuries. A limit-
ation to recovery, however, is the use in admiralty of comparative
negligence which can lessen a judgment for damages according
to the ratio of fault between the shipowner and the seaman as
determined by the jury.'5
Two years later, the Supreme Court, in Carlisle Packing Co.
v. Sandanger,16 first distinguished unseaworthiness from the neg-
ligence standard of ordinary care and described the shipowner's
duty to provide a seaworthy vessel as "absolute." Though such a
determination was unnecessary to the case, as the seaman's in-
juries occurred while he was making a fire with gas, negligently
placed in containers marked "coal oil," it was very important
in influencing the interpretation of the doctrine of unseaworthi-
ness. According to Sandanger, the vessel could be unseaworthy
without negligence, and liability would attach if the unseaworthi-
ness caused a crewman's injuries. Permitting unseaworthiness
without negligence would in the future provide the seaman with
another important ground of recovery for his injuries.
In the two decades following Sandanger, federal courts enun-
ciated a concept of absolute liability for unseaworthiness and
litigation was abundant.' 7 Also during this period, statutory re-
medies for longshoremen were changed. For a time, longshore-
men were covered by the Jones Act, but that situation was chan-
ged in 1927 when Congress passed the Longshoremen's and Har-
12. 41 Stat. 988, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964).
13. 2 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 660 (3d ed. 1970).
14. Id.
15. M. NoRRIs, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 44 (2d ed. 1966).
16. 259 U.S. 255 (1922).
17. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 547 (1960).
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bor Worker's Compensation Act.'8 Like other workmen's com-
pensation schemes, the Longshoremen's Act is an exchange be-
tween employer and employee whereby employers give up com-
mon law defenses (such as the fellow-servant rule, assumption of
risk, contributory negligence) and employees give up their right
to an action against the employer for personal injuries incurred
while on the job. As a result, maximum employer's payments for
employee's injuries are limited, and employees receive benefits,
regardless of who was at fault, covering at least hospitalization
and medical care and subsistence wages, according to schedules
and rates set by statute.'9 Though compensation under the Act
is the longshoreman's exclusive remedy against his employer, the
Act does allow a longshoreman's suit against a third party.20 And,
since 1959, by such a third party suit, the longshoreman does
not forfeit his right to compensation under the provisions of the
Longshoremen's Act.
21
In 1944, the absolute nature of shipowner liability for unsea-
worthiness was made conclusive by the Supreme Court's land-
mark decision of Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.22 The seaman's
injuries were caused when the staging upon which he was work-
ing gave way because a rotted piece of rope was used by the ship's
mate to support it. Since there was plenty of good rope on
board, the shipowner argued that he had met his duty to use or-
dinary care in providing a seaworthy ship and that he should not
.be held liable for the negligence of the ship's mate (in using de-
fective rather than sound rope).28 But the Court rejected this
argument, saying: "If the owner is liable for furnishing an unsea-
worthy appliance, even when he is not negligent, a fortiori his
obligation is unaffected by the fact that the negligence of the
officers of the vessel contribued to its unseaworthiness. '24 The
ship was found to be unseaworthy because the staging was
inadequate for its intended purpose, "whether the mate's failure
18. 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1964) [hereinafter cited as Longshore-
men's Act].
19. M. Noius, supra note 15, at § 140.
20. 44 Stat. 1440, 33 U.S.C, § 933 (a) (1964).
21. Election requirement deleted by amendment, Pub. L. No. 86-171, 72 Stat.
391 (1959).
22. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
23. Id. at 101.
24. Id. at 100.
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to observe the defect was negligent or unavoidable." 25 Accord-
ingly, the shipowner was held liable. After Mahnich, nearly all
acts of negligence would create unseaworthiness. 26
Shortly thereafter, in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki," the
Court extended the doctrine of unseaworthiness to cover the in-
juries of longshoremen working aboard ship. The longshoreman,
while operating a winch aboard ship, was injured when the
boom and shackle fell on him during loading operations. Sub-
sequently, a defect was discovered in the forging of the shackle.
The Court found that the longshoreman was entitled to the sea-
man's traditional protections against unseaworthiness, because
the longshoreman was "doing a seaman's work and incurring a
seaman's hazards." 28 In reaching this conclusion,29 the Court
made the following, frequently quoted statement about unsea-
worthiness:
It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to
other wellknown instances in our law . . . . [T]he liability is
neither limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in
character. It is a form of absolute duty owing to all within
the range of its humanitarian policy.3 0
This very broad statement of policy, coupled with the holding
of Sieracki-a classic example of "judicial legislation"-substan-
tially increased the willingness of courts to hold the shipowner
liable for injury to anyone working on or around the ship, no
matter how the injury occurred.
The Court found unseaworthiness and imposed liability on
the shipowner for injuries suffered by a painter when he fell
through an uncovered hatchhole;81 by a longshoreman whose in-
juries were caused by a defective breaking block brought on board
by the stevedoring contractor (the longshoreman's employer); 2
by a seaman who was attacked by a drunken fellow crewman
25. Id. at 103.
26. M. Noims, supra note 15, at § 40.
27. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
28. Id. at 99.
29. For a challenge to the accuracy of this important historical observation, see
Comment, The "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine and its Application to Longshoremen,
22 U. M ua L. Rav. 937, 946-51 (1968).
30. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946).
31. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
32. Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 396, rehearing denied, 347 U.S. 994 (1954).
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with dangerous proclivities;33 and by a longshoreman who slip-
ped on beans which had fallen onto the dock from defective con-
tainers during unloading operationsY4 From these cases, it is
obvious that unseaworthiness in admiralty law means something
much more than what the word literally connotes. It has become
a word of art-a significant doctrine of absolute liability for in-
juries sustained by those who work in and around ships, "acknowl-
edged to be a device created to shift the unusually high risk in-
herent in maritime service from those least able to assume it
and to distribute it over the industry as a whole, without regard
to fault. ' 3
5
The doctrine is not without its confusion, most of which is in
the area of "operational negligence." From the very first cases,
unseaworthiness resulted from the shipowner's failure to provide
sound appliances appurtenant to the ship-including winches,
cargo containers, ropes, hatchcovers, etc. But what of the injury
caused by negligent use of a fit appurtenance by an otherwise
competent seaman or longshoreman? Does such an act of negli-
gence instantaneously create unseaworthiness? Or, is opera-
tional negligence beyond the scope of the unseaworthiness
doctrine? As late as 1966, one prominent author in the area of
maritime personal injuries noted the conflict among the courts
on this issue and suggested that only the Supreme Court could
definitively resolve the matter."
Judge Learned Hand delt with this difficult question in Gril-
lea v. United States.37 A longshoreman's injury resulted from a
hatchcover which he and another longshoreman had negligently
replaced. In finding the vessel unseaworthy, Judge Hand realized
that his conclusion might appear strange, but he noted that
liability in this area is imposed regardless of faulty8 He went
on to distinguish between a negligent act causing an unseaworthy
condition which continued until time of the injury (for which
liability would be imposed) and an instantaneous negligent act
which caused an injury (for which liability would not be im-
33. Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
34. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
35. Comment, Instant Unseaworthiness: Mascuilli Revisled, I J. MAIuTIME L.
CoM. 573 (1970).
36. M. Noiuus, supra note 15, at § 38.
37. 232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956).
38. Id. at 923.
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posed).3  This formulation was subsequently called the act-
condition dichotomy. Since unseaworthiness is a condition and
not an act, liability would only be imposed if some time had
elapsed after the equipment was negligently used.
The obvious difficulty with the distinction is in deciding
when the act becomes a condition. It was not long before writers
seized upon this difficulty and became critical of the Judge's analy-
sis.4° One writer urged rejection of the act-condition dichotomy be-
cause "an injured seaman or longshoreman financially is no more
able to bear the risk inherent in his trade if he is injured by an
act than if he is injured by a condition."41 And even the Second
Circuit questioned the viability of Judge Hand's formulation:
"[E]very act of negligence, no matter how short-lived, creates an
unsafe condition for those exposed to it."'42 Another writer notes:
"Of course as to the injured men, any distinction vanishes. Both
are injured through carelessness of fellow workers. 4 3 The con-
flict among the courts in this area grew.
It is difficult to know whether the Supreme Court meant to
decide the issue conclusively in its cryptic per curiam opinion of
Mascuilli v. United States.44 Mascuilli, a longshoreman, was
killed when his fellow longshoremen negligently allowed cables
on a winch's boom aboard ship to become taut causing one of the
vangs to recoil and fall. Because the equipment was found to be in
proper working condition, the district court found the vessel
seaworthy, the accident having been caused solely by the negli-
gent operation of the boom by the longshoremen. 45 The Third
Circuit affirmed, 4 but the Supreme Court reversed, per curiam,
citing Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.47 and Crumady v. The
J.H. Fisser.48 In the Crumady case, a longshoreman was injured
when part of a winch broke and fell on him due to his fellow
longshoremen's negligent use of the winch in trying to lift twice its
safe working load. The winch's "cut-off" mechanism (a circuit
39. Id. at 922-23.
40. M. NORRIS, supra note 15, at § 38.
41. Comment, supra note 35, at 599.
42. Reid v. Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1965).
43. Zobel, The Unseaworthy Instant, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 200, 217 (1970).
44. 387 U.S. 237 (1967).
45. Mascuilli v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
46. Mascuilli v. United States, 358 F2d 133 (3d Cir. 1966).
47. 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
ASi. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
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breaker) was fully operational but had been negligently set by a
seaman at twice the safe working load. The district court found the
vessel unseaworthy and imposed liability; but, because the long-
shoremen were negligent in bringing "into play the unseaworthy
condition of the vessel," the stevedoring company was ordered to
indemnify the shipowner for injuries to the plaintiff.4 The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the vessel
was not unseaworthy and that the sole cause of the injury was the
negligence of petitioner's fellow longshoremen50 The Supreme
Court reversed, endorsing the analysis of the district court.,' If,
by citing this case and Mahnich in Mascuilli the Court
intended to settle the issue of whether operational negligence
rendered a vessel unseaworthy, it failed to achieve its purpose,
because neither case cited involved only the issue of operational
negligence. Confusion followed.
On the one hand, relying on the Mascuilli case and lower
court decisions which followed it, Norris concluded that "[n]o
longer can there be any doubt that 'operational negligence' makes
a vessel unseaworthy. '5 2 He then quoted a statement from a
Fourth Circuit case: "It is settled that the negligent misuse of safe
and sufficient equipment renders a vessel unseaworthy." 3 In mak-
ing this statement, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals relied up-
on the language and holding of Waldron v. Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc.," which decided the question of whether a vessel is
rendered unseaworthy when its officers assign too few crewmen to
perform a particular task in a safe and prudent manner. Answer-
ing in the affirmative for a Court split 5-4, Justice Black wrote:
And in Crumady v. The J. H. Fisser, 358 U. S. 423, we further
clarified the extent of unseaworthiness liability by holding that,
even though the equipment furnished for the particular task is
itself safe and sufficient, its misuse by the crew members renders
the vessel unseaworthy.55
49. Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 142 F. Supp. 389 (D.N.J. 1956).
50. Crumady v. The J.H. Fisser, 249 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1957).
51. 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
52. M. NoRRIs, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES § 38 (Supp. 1971).
53. Venable v. A/S Det Forende Dampskibbsselskab, 399 F.2d 347, 351 (th Cir.
1968).
54. 386 U.S. 724 (1967).
55. Id. at 726-27.
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In addition, the Second Circuit concurred with this view in apply-
ing Mascuilli, thus rejecting their own Circuit's formulation by
Judge Hand in Grillea5
On the other hand, some suggested that Mascuilli was in-
adequate and only added to the already substantial confusion. 7
Both the Ninth58 and FifthG9 Circuits continued to think that
operational negligence did not render a vessel unseaworthy. Wald-
ron was distinguished because it did not consider whether long-
shoremen's negligence in itself constituted unseaworthiness. 0
Masculli was considered "inapposite" because it answered
affirmatively only the first question posed in the petition for
certiorari: whether a prior unseaworthy condition came into play
because the safety devices for each winch were set far in excess
of the safe working* load.01 The Ninth Circuit thought that
Mahnich and Crumady were cited primarily because of factual
similarity. Thus, in the view of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court had not reached the other question presented regarding
the negligent handling of proper equipment. But the Usner case
of the Fifth Circuit stated the precise question:
The sole issue is whether a ship is rendered unseaworthy as a
result of the instantaneous negligence of stevedores, this negli-
gence resulting in the injury of another stevedore, when all the
equipment and appurtenances aboard the ship are admittedly
in a seaworthy condition0
2
Though the Fifth Circuit in Usner held that it did not render
the vessel unseaworthy, it did note that "Mascuilli raised serious
doubt as to the continuing vitality of this holding."
'63
Whatever doubts the Fifth Circuit might have had have now
been dispelled by the Supreme Court's decision affirming Usner.64
Writing for the five-man majority, Mr. Justice Stewart stressed
56. Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1027 (1968); Alexander v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 382 F.2d 963
(2d Cir. 1967). cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1064 (1969).
57. Zobel, supra note 43, at 214.
58. Tim v. American President Lines, Ltd., 409 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1969).
59. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. v. Usner, 413 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1969).
60. Tim v. American President Lines, Ltd., 409 F.2d 385, 389 (9th Cir. 1969).
61. Id. at 390-91.
62. Luckenbach Overseas Corp. v. Usner, 413 F.2d 984, 985 (5th Cir. 1969).
63. Id.-
64. 400 U.S. 494, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 1015 (1971).
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that "unseaworthiness is a condition,"' 5 whether it came about by
negligence or otherwise. Thus, "liability based upon unseaworth-
iness is wholly distinct from liability based upon negligence." 0
This distinction was previously emphasized in the Court's deci-
sion of Mitchell v. Trawler Racer. 7 In that case, a seaman was
injured when he slipped and fell on the ship's rail which was
covered with fish gurry and slime from recently completed un-
loading operations. Plaintiff's action for damages alleged both
negligence and unseaworthiness. The district court instructed the
jury that because the shipowner is liable for an unseaworthy
condition only if there is a failure to exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances, an unseaworthy condition could not be found
unless some time had passed during which the condition should
have been discovered and corrected."" The First Circuit affirmed, "
but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that constructive notice
was not necessary to support liability for unseaworthiness. 70 The
lower court had, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, confused
liability for negligence with liability for unseaworthiness. In
Trawler Racer, the Court said: "What has evolved is a complete
divorcement of unseaworthiness liability from concepts of negli-
gence."71 But then, the Court added this caveat:
What has been said is not to suggest that the owner is obligated
to furnish an accident-free ship. The duty is absolute, but it is
a duty only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit
for their intended use. The standard is not perfection, but reason-
able fitness .... 72
Accordingly, after this review of Trawler Racer, the majority
viewed the Usner case as an accident, which does not create unsea-
worthiness, because the petitioner's injuries were not caused by
"the condition of the ship, her appurtenances, her cargo, or her
crew, but the isolated, personal negligent act of the petitioner's
fellow longshoreman."" "[N]o condition of unseaworthiness
65. Instant case at 498.
66. Id.
67. 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
68. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 434 (D. Mass. 1958).
69. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426 (lst Cir. 1959).
70. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
71. Id. at 550.
72. Id.
73. Instant case at 500.
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existed . . ."74 because everything aboard ship was reasonably fit
for its intended use, including the longshoreman who had negli-
gently operated the winch. His single, wholly unforeseeable act
was not sufficient to create an unseaworthy condition.
Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the 6-3 majority decision
in Crumady, was joined by Justices Black, Brennan, and
Harlan in dissenting. Both Douglas, and Harlan in his short
separate dissent,71 thought that the issue had already been de-
cided by Crumady and Mascuilli. The thrust of Douglas' dissent
was directed against the change in position he feels has taken
place as a result of the new membership of the Court: "Prior
to the 1970 Term the judgment denying recovery would have
been reversed, probably out of hand. '76
Despite this observation about Supreme Court politics, the
only question raised by the dissent is whether Usner represents
a reversal of precedent. Though the majority states that "[t]he
present case . . . offers n6 occasion to re-examine any of our
previous decisions, '77 its decision in Usner has at least reversed
the expansionary trend of the last twenty-five years for the doc-
trine of unseaworthiness. Nevertheless, while affirming the Fifth
Circuit's decision, the Supreme Court did not restate the lower
court's broad conclusion that instant unseaworthiness resulting
from operational negligence is not a basis for recovery by an injur-
ed longshoreman. Instead it stated that a single and unforeseeable
act of negligence which causes injury to a longshoreman will
not result in unseaworthiness. This decision re-establishes the
much-criticized act-condition dichotomy, but the Court has offered
no guidelines or discussion to aid lower courts in making this
distinction. This may cause considerable confusion as lower courts
attempt to apply Usner. But this is not the only inadequacy of
the majority opinion.
The questions raised by Mascuilli are too perplexing to be dis-
missed without discussion. The Court in the instant case addresses.
itself to Mascuilli in a footnote only78 and adopts the analysis
of the Ninth Circuit which argued that the Court never reach-
74. Id.
75. Id. at 503 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 501 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77. Instant case at 497.
78. Id. at 500 n.19.
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ed the questions posed regarding operational negligence, and in-
stead answered affirmatively only the first question posed in the
Mascuilli brief which had to do with maladjusted safety devices on
the winches. Even without the help of Douglas' dissenting anal-
ysis of what the Court did in Mascuilli, the Ninth Circuit's inter-
pretation seems improbable. Regarding the safety devices, the
district court specifically found that "[i]n this situation, the cut-
offs in the winch motor and circuit breaker will not be affected
by the amperage and thus the cut-off will not trip." ' Therefore,
the safety devices were in no way relevant in causing the injury.
It seems doubtful that the Supreme Court would have reversed
on the sole ground that the maladjusted safety devices created
an unseaworthy condition when the devices were specifically found
not to have played a part in causing the injury. Absent such a
finding by the lower court, Crumady of course would have
been directly on point and good authority for summary rever-
sal. But with the district court's finding of fact, it is more likely
that the Court viewed all the questions posed in the context of
the facts, and then decided to reverse.80 Mascuilli should either
have been overruled or explained and distinguished as involving
a question different than operational negligence.
The most serious inadequacy of the Usner opinion, however,
is the Court's failure to make a compelling argument for its posi-
tion. This inadequacy has already been noted by other writers.8 '
But they have apparently failed, as the Court has, to view
the problem from the standpoint of remedies-to examine what
remedies are being made available to seamen and longshoremen
for their injuries.
The question of remedies has always been an important one
in the area of maritime personal injuries. Courts have realized
the need to equalize the remedies for persons being exposed to
the same dangers and circumstances.8 2 This is one way of look-
ing at both the landmark decision of Sieracki in which the Court
extended to longshoremen a cause of action against the ship-
79. Mascuilli v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 354, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
80. See Candiano v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 382 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1967),
•cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1027 (1968).
81. See Note, 31 LA. L. REv. 650 (1971); Comment, Narrowing the Warranty
of Seaworthiness to Longshoremen, 50 ORr. L. REV. 197 (1971); Note, 49
TEXAS L. REv. 911 (1971).
82. See Tetreault, supra note 5.
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owner for unseaworthiness., and the long line of cases during
the past twenty-five years which have expanded the' scope of
the shipowner's liability for unseaworthiness to all those per-
forming needed services aboard ship. The question, therefore, is
whether longshoremen need a remedy based on unseaworthiness
for injuries caused by the negligence of fellow longshoremen, and
whether the doctrine of unseaworthiness should be extended in
order to equalize the remedies of longshoremen and seamen.
Due to the inherent confinement of the seaman aboard ship,
maintenance and cure, as has already been noted,83 has long
been part of the shipowner's liability. A remedy for fellow sea-
man's negligence is provided by the Jones Act, while the long-
shoreman's remedy for negligence of a fellow worker is the Long-
shoremen's Act. A primary difference between the two statutes
is that the Longshoremen's Act has a fixed schedule of benefits
while the Jones Act allows a suit for damages based on negligence.
Though Jones Act damages are potentially unlimited, it is by.no
means clear that recoveries are larger under the Jones Act than
under the Longshoremen's Act.8 4 Arguably, the injured are
frequently better off under fixed compensation schemes than
under negligence litigation due to the substantial attorney's fees
which are commonly taken out of the awards . 5 Furthermore, bene-
fits under the Longshoremen's Act are fixed regardless of how the
accident occurred. But under the Jones Act, defenses to the action
are available, most important of which is comparative negligence.
In light of this, it may be appropriate that nearly all acts of
negligence will cause an unseaworthy condition for which the
shipowner will be held absolutely liable to the seaman. As a re-
sult, the shipowner could assert no defense to defeat liability.
Case law has not established that the negligent act of one sea-
man which injures another seaman creates an unseaworthy condi-
tion. But even if that were established, it is no reason to apply
the same standard for unseaworthiness to longshoremen. Long-
shoremen already have a fully effective remedy for a co-worker's
negligent act. Likewise, longshoremen will and should continue
83. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
84. See Shields & Byrne, Application of the "Unseaworthiness" Doctrine to Long-
shoremen, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1137, 1147-48 (1963).
85. Id.
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to have a remedy for unseaworthiness, as it has been defined in
the case law, but
[t]here is no sound reason to give them the additional right
to sue a shipowner for injuries resulting from the negligent acts
of their fellow employees which do not make the ship unsea-
worthy, but which constitute negligent operation of seaworthy
equipment by .the fellow employees of the plaintiff.8 6
Imposition of strict liability is most frequently justified
where an unusually hazardous situation is caused by a particular
service which society recognizes as necessary. In recognition of
both the inherent danger and the necessity, the law imposes strict
liability for injuries or damages caused by such activity.8 7 The
Longshoremen's Act imposes a form of strict liability on the em-
ployer. Also, absolute liability is imposed for unseaworthiness.
But there seems to be no reason to extend unseaworthiness to
cover situations already covered by remedial legislation. The dan-
ger has already been dealt with. If the benefits are inadequate,
they should be changed by Congress.
Another important consideration is the impact strict lia-
bility has on. the employer. The possibility of large awards due
to injuries from defective equipment will certainly motivate the
shipowner to keep his ship and its gear in the best possible con-
dition. When injury is caused by the neglient act of a longshore-
man, however, there is nothing the shipowner can do to lessen
the risk of injury. He does not decide who to hire or who does
what work. But, even if liability is imposed upon the shipowner
for operational negligence, he can in turn recover from the long-
shoreman's employer.8 " Thus, imposition of strict liability on
the shipowner serves no purpose. The dominant concerns are to
minimize the level of risk, and to guarantee compensation for any
injuries that occur. That objective can be fully met without im-
position of liability on the shipowners for injuries immediately
caused by isolated negligent acts of longshoremen.
86. Blankenship v. Ellerman's Wilson Lines, New York, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 479,
483 (D. Md. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 265 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1959).
87. W. PRossER, LAw OF ToRTs § 78 (3d ed. 1964).
88. For a criticism of this cycle which completely circumvents the Long-
shoremen's Act, see Amerman, Unseaworthiness, Operational Negligence and the
Death of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 43 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 550 (1968).
RECENT CASES
Consequently, courts may continue to go to great lengths to
find unseaworthiness and thus liability for structural or mechan-
ical defects, but may refuse, as the Supreme Court has, to recog-
nize liability for human defects and errors. Much of this can be
traced to earlier conceptions of the shipowner's liability. Though
his duty to furnish a seaworthy ship was absolute, he was re-
quired only to furnish appliances appurtenant to the ship which
were reasonably suited for their intended purpose. This created
a great deal of confusion. If a machine broke and caused an in-
jury, it was obviously not suited for the intended purpose. There-
fore, it was unseaworthy, and the shipowner was liable. But if an
injury was caused by human error, so long as the actor
met ordinary standards of competence, he was still suited for the
purpose intended. Therefore, the vessel was not unseaworthy
and liability did not obtain. But what is actually the difference
between the two types of defects? They are both reasonably fore-
seeable in the sense that they can be expected to occur. They
are both equally dangerous in terms of the risk they impose upon
the longshoremen. They may both be difficult or impossible to dis-
cover and prevent. Though it is theoretically possible to find and
correct every physical or mechanical defect, present levels of tech-
nology and cost restraints prohibit elimination of all physical
deficiencies from the ship and its equipment. Further, the issue of
control has also already been disposed of; that is, the shipowner
cannot escape liability because he had no control over the opera-
tion which caused the injury.89 Fault is not a distinguishing
feature, because the shipowner has done no wrong in either the
the case of injury caused by latent physical defect or negligent
human error. Thus, there simply does not seem to be a rational,
valid distinction which can be made between physical defect and
human negligence for purposes of imposing liability on the ship-
owner. But courts may continue to act as if there is a difference.
The Fifth Circuit provides an excellent example.
In Law v. Victory Carriers, Inc.,90 for which the Supreme
Court has recently granted certiorari,91 a longshoreman's in-
89. See Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 396, rehearing denied, 847 U.S. 994 (1954), in which shipowner was held
liable for injuries caused by a defective breaking block owned and brought on board
by the stevedoring contractor.
90. 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970).
91. 401 U.S. 936 (1971).
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juries were caused when the overhead protection rack on his
fork-lift machine came loose and fell on him. Investigation re-
vealed that the bolts which should have secured the rack were miss-
ing. Though at the time of the injury he was not even engaged in
loading cargo onto the ship, the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 2 Extension by the
court of unseaworthiness to cover this accident was justified as
serving the "humanitarian policy which underlies the doctrine."03
Remembering it was the Fifth Circuit which denied recovery in
Usner, this case seems quite anomalous-a perfect illustration of
the physical defect-human error dichotomy.
It is likely, however, that the Supreme Court will apply
Usner and reverse Victory Carriers. Usner has already been,
used to limit the doctrine of unseaworthiness in several cases,9
4
leading one court to say: "Based upon the Supreme Court's re-
cent holdings, this court feels that liability of a vessel is being cir-
cumscribed . . . -"I Given the coverage afforded longshoremen
by statutory and decisional law, such a circumscription does not
seem harsh or unreasonable. Though it is conceptually difficult
if not impossible to distinguish between liability for mechanical
or physical defect and liability for human error, it is clear that
a longshoreman has adequate remedies for his injuries caused by
negligent acts of fellow workers. Therefore, he does not need
protection under the unseaworthiness doctrine for operational
negligence. It is probable that the Court will extend Usner to
include the situation posed in Victory Carriers. Such a de-
cision could also be based on the theory that the longshoreman
does not need the protection against unseaworthiness. That neither
the Supreme Court nor its commentators realized the "need for
a remedy" approach is unfortunate. But more important is that
the decision of Usner, if not the opinion of the Court, is appro-
priate and thoroughly justifiable.
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